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FUSTER V. STATE: AN INDIGENT PETITIONER IS NOT 
ENTITLED TO COUNSEL FOR A POST CONVICTION 
PETITION AS THE DECISION IS WITHIN THE COURT’S 
DISCRETION.  
 
By: Bradley T. Bald 
 
     The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that Maryland Rule 4-707(b) does 
not entitle an indigent petitioner to counsel for purposes of a post conviction 
petition for DNA testing.  Fuster v. State, 437 Md. 653, 657-58, 89 A.3d 
1114, 1116 (2014).  In addition, the court held that the circuit court did not 
abuse its discretion by failing to consider whether to appoint the petitioner 
counsel under under section 8-201 of the Maryland Criminal Procedure 
Code.  Id.  The court further held that the circuit court used the correct legal 
standard in ruling on the petition.  Id.  Finally, the court held that the 
petitioner failed to preserve for appellate review whether the circuit court 
clearly erred in concluding that the State conducted a reasonable search for 
the victim’s socks and shoes.  Id.   
     On October 10, 2001, fifteen-year-old W.K. visited the dental office of 
David E. Fuster (“Fuster”).  During the visit Fuster administered gas to 
W.K., causing her to drift in and out of consciousness.  W.K. awoke several 
times to Fuster sexually massaging different parts of her body.  W.K. also 
observed Fuster force her on top of him.  The incident ended with W.K.’s bra 
undone, her shirt halfway up, and Fuster naked.  Later that day, a sexual 
assault forensic nurse examiner examined W.K.  The nurse testified that she 
placed “each piece of clothing . . . in a separate bag” and checked W.K. from 
“head to toe.”  
     Fuster was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Montgomery 
County of second-degree rape, child abuse, third-degree sexual offense, and 
second-degree assault.  Fuster appealed his conviction to the Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland which affirmed.  Fuster then petitioned for a writ of 
certiorari, which the Court of Appeals of Maryland denied. 
     On November 3, 2010, Fuster filed a “Petition for DNA Testing – Post 
Conviction Review” (“the Petition”) in the circuit court.  In the Petition, 
Fuster requested that W.K.’s underpants, leg cuffs, socks, and shoes be tested 
using DNA analysis for Fuster’s epithelial cells, but failed to request 
appointment of counsel.  After two hearings, the circuit court denied the 
Petition and Fuster appealed.  Prior to rendering a decision, the Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland transferred the case to the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland on its own initiative.  
     The Court of Appeals of Maryland began its analysis by discussing how 
an appellate court interprets a Maryland Rule.  Fuster, 437 Md. at 664, 89 
A.3d at 1120.  An appellate court interpret a Maryland Rule using the same 
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“canons of construction” that the court would use to interpret a statute.  Id. 
(citing Hoile v. State, 404 Md. 591, 608, 948 A.2d, 30, 40, cert. denied, 555 
U.S. 884 (2008)).  More specifically, if a rule’s plain language is 
“unambiguous and clearly consistent with the [r]ule’s apparent purpose,” the 
court will apply its plain language.  Id. at 664-65, 89 A.3d at 1120 (quoting 
State v. Weems, 429 Md. 329, 337, 55 A.3d 921, 926 (2012)).  However, if a 
rule’s plain language is not consistent with the rule’s apparent purpose, the 
court will look for “rulemaking intent in other indicia” in light of the rule’s 
structure, relation to other laws, general purpose, and the “legal effect of 
various competing constructions.”  Fuster, 437 Md. at 665, 89 A.3d at 1120 
(quoting State v. Johnson, 415 Md. 413, 422, 2 A.3d 368, 373 (2010)).   
     Regarding the Petition, the court honed in on Rule 4-707(b)’s (“the Rule”) 
pertinent language: “If the court finds that a petitioner . . . is indigent, the 
court shall appoint counsel.”  Fuster, 437 Md. at 665, 89 A.3d at 1120-21 
(quoting Md. R. 4-707(b) (LexisNexis 2014) (emphasis added)).  Pursuant to 
the Rule’s plain language, a trial court must appoint counsel for an indigent 
petitioner for a post conviction petition for DNA testing.  Id. at 667, 89 A.3d 
at 1121.  However, the court acknowledged that the Rule’s plain language is 
not clearly consistent with the court’s purpose in adopting the Rule.  Id. at 
666, 89 A.3d at 1121 (quoting Weems, 429 Md. at 337, 55 A.3d at 926).  In 
implementing the Rule, the court relied heavily on its decision in Simms v. 
State.  Id. at 666-67, 89 A.3d at 1121-1122 (See generally Simms v. State, 
409 Md. 722, 976 A.2d 1012 (2009)).  Simms established that the 
appointment of counsel for purposes of a petition is discretionary and within 
the inherent power of the court.  Id. (citing Simms, 409 Md. at 756 n.5, 976 
A.2d at 1015 n.5) (emphasis added)).  
    Having determined that the Rule’s plain language is not consistent with its 
apparent purpose, the court focused on rulemaking intent in other indicia.  
Fuster, 437 Md. at 667, 89 A.3d at 1122 (citing Johnson, 415 Md. at 422, 2 
A.3d at 373 (2010)).  The court referred to the 2009 Rules Committee 
Meetings on the Rule to establish its intent.  Fuster, 437 Md. at 667-68, 89 
A.3d at 1122.  Based on the notes from those meetings, the court determined 
that the Committee intended that a trial court would have the discretion to 
appoint counsel for an indigent petitioner for the purpose of a post conviction 
petition for DNA testing.  Id. at 668, 89 A.3d at 1122 (citing MD. RULE 4-
707(b) RULE COMM. MEETING (2009)).  Because the Committee’s motive 
was to give trial court’s such discretionary power, the court held that the 
Rule does not entitle an indigent petitioner to counsel.  Id. at 669, 89 A.3d at 
1123.  
     The Court of Appeals of Maryland then addressed Fuster’s contention that 
the circuit court abused its discretion by not considering whether to appoint 
him counsel.  Fuster, 437 Md. at 669, 89 A.3d at 1123.  According to the 
Rule, “If the court finds that a petitioner . . . has requested the appointment of 
counsel . . . the court shall appoint counsel . . . .”  Id. (quoting Md. R. 4-
707(b)).  Based on this language, the court determined that the Rule 
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presumes a petitioner has requested counsel in the petition.  Id. at 670, 89 
A.3d at 1123.  Because Fuster failed to request the appointment of counsel, 
the Court of Appeals of Maryland concluded that the circuit court did not 
abuse its discretion in not contemplating the appoint of counsel for Fuster.  
Id.  
     Next, the court addressed whether the circuit court applied the correct 
legal standard in ruling on the Petition.  Fuster, 437 Md. at 671, 89 A.3d at 
1123-24.  A court will order DNA testing if it finds there to be a reasonable 
probability that DNA testing has the “potential to produce exculpatory or 
mitigating evidence.”  Id. at 671, 89 A.3d at 1124 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., 
CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(d)(1)(i) (LexisNexis 2014)).  Further, a petitioner may 
move for a new trial if he or she can show that the conviction was based on 
“unreliable scientific evidence and a substantial possibility exists that the 
petitioner would not have been convicted without the evidence.”  Fuster, 437 
Md. at 671, 89 A.3d at 1124 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-
201(c)).   The court noted that the circuit court was well aware of where to 
use the two standards and correctly stated their uses during the hearing.  
Fuster, 437 Md. at 671-72, 89 A.3d at 1124.  Therefore, the court concluded 
that the circuit court correctly used the substantial possibility standard in 
ruling on the Petition.  Id. at 672, 89 A.3d at 1124. 
     Finally, the Court of Appeals of Maryland considered whether Fuster 
failed to preserve the issue of whether the circuit court erred in concluding 
that the State conducted a reasonable search for W.K.’s socks and shoes.  
Fuster, 437 Md. at 673, 89 A.3d at 1124.  The court emphasized that Fuster 
not only failed to object to the State’s proffer that the State had never 
collected W.K.’s socks and shoes, but also conceded that the State had never 
collected those items.  Fuster, 437 Md. at 673, 89 A.3d at 1125. A party 
neglects to preserve any issues with a trial court’s decision by intentionally 
“inviting” the court’s decision.  Id. (citing State v. Rich, 415 Md. 567, 581, 3 
A.3d 1210, 1218 (2010)).  By conceding, Fuster invited the court to conclude 
that any search for W.K.’s socks and shoes would be “fruitless,” and 
therefore failed to preserve the issue for appellate review.  Id.  
     In Fuster, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that an indigent 
petitioner is not entitled to the appointment of counsel for a post conviction 
petition.  Even though a rule’s apparent purpose may conflict with its plain 
language, the court clearly established that the appointment of counsel is 
within the trial court’s discretionary power.  Nevertheless, such discretion 
will likely burden future indigent petitioners because the appointment of 
counsel is not guaranteed.  The ruling not only gives deference to a court’s 
inherent power, but also alerts Maryland practitioners to be conscientious of 
post conviction legal standards. 
 
